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FINANCIALIZATION: CAUSES, INEQUALITY
CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
BY DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY & KEN-Hou LIN*

The U.S. is now a financialized economy, where the financial
sector and its priorities have become increasingly dominant in all
aspects of the economy. We focus on financialization as a process of
income redistribution with two faces. The first face is one of rent
seeking by an increasingly concentrated and politically influential
finance sector. This rent seeking has been successful, leading to the
pooling ofprofits and income in the finance sector. The secondface is a
shift in behavior of non-finance firms away from production and nonfinancial services and towardfinancial investments and services. This
shift has had both strategicand normative components and has reduced
the bargainingpower of labor and the centrality of production. As a
consequence,financializationof the non-finance sector has led to lower
employment, income transfers to executives and capital owners, and
increasedinequality among workers. We discuss the policy implications
of these consequences at the end of this Article.
I. INTRODUCTION

Modem economies are always changing-inventing new
technologies, creating new markets, adopting new regulations and
institutions, and incorporating new labor forces while shedding old
ones. Many of these changes are incremental, deepening or redirecting
current activity. Others are more fundamental, like the move from
feudal to capitalist economic institutions, or agrarian to manufacturingdominated production. There is reason to believe that the U.S. economy
is going through a similarly large transformation and is now becoming
* Donald Tomaskovic-Devey is Professor of Sociology at University of Massachusetts,
Amherst. Ken-Hou Lin is Assistant Professor of Sociology at University of Texas, Austin.
We thank James Crotty and Gerald Epstein for their thoughts on the policy conclusions of
this Article. We also appreciate Jacob Gerber, Patricia McCoy, Cowden Rayburn, and the
editorial team for their thoughtful comments and suggestions throughout this Article. The
research reported in this Article was supported by the National Science Foundation, the
Institute for New Economic Thinking and the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
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dominated by financial firms and financial conceptions of both control
and investment. Established firms are less and less treated as production
units, but as bundles of tradable assets. Profits flow increasingly from
financial investments, rather than trade in goods and services.
The functioning of the economy is no longer evaluated in terms
of the production of employment or rising standards of living, but by the
movements of the stock market, the realization of shareholder value,
and the profits of the financial sector. Politicians on either side of the
political spectrum now take extreme measures to ensure the growth of
the stock market and the profitability of the finance sector, but pay only
lip service to the well-being of most citizens.
There are two faces to this financialization of the economy that
most concern us and that we discuss in this Article. In the first we have
the increasing centrality of the finance sector to the U.S. economy. This
face was produced by changes in the regulatory environment for
financial markets and led to the transfer of a great deal of national
income into the finance sector, as well as the more familiar "too big to
fail or jail" and systemic risk problems associated with the resulting
market concentration of finance. The second face, which is probably
less well known to the readers of this journal, is the movement of the
non-finance parts of the economy into the world of financial investment,
rather than investment in production.' This face was also the product of
new financial market institutions, exacerbated by finance sector
pressures for short-term profit orientations in the management of nonfinance firms and the agency-theory-based linkage of CEO pay to
equity options. 2 Although we discuss both processes, we focus more on
the less familiar distortion of income distributions in the non-finance
sector.
In this article we summarize research which shows that the
financialization of the U.S. economy is one of the fundamental drivers
of the rise of income inequality in the United States. It is not only that
1. Greta R. Krippner has the foundational statement on this double movement. She
made the empirical argument in her 2005 paper The Financialization of the American
Economy, 3 Socio-EcoNoMIc

REVIEW 173 (presenting a detailed description of the

regulatory process that elevated

the financial principle in her 2011

monograph,

CAPITALIZING ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE RISE OF FINANCE.

2. Gerald Davis argues that there are two additional dimensions: the adoption of
investment behaviors at the household level and a general normative shift to value
investments over work in all phases of life. See GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE
MARKETS: How FINANCE RE-SHAPED AMERICA ( 2009).
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financial income is funneled to the top 1% of the population through
equity ownership, but also that it distorts the rest of the economy,
reducing employment and economic well-being for many people,
increasing inequality among wage earners, while also increasing the
share of national income going to capital and corporate executives at the
expense of employees and their households. Financialization distorts
economic investment and reduces the mutual dependence of capital and
labor, eroding the social contract in which capitalism delivers profits to
the owners of capital and a growing standard of living to citizens. Much
of the discussion around regulation of the financial sector focuses on the
problem of banks "too big to fail" and a financial system that is said to
be too fragile to survive regulation. Our analyses suggest that the
problem is worse. Financialization goes beyond the financial system
and distorts income distributions, job creation, and investment
throughout the economy.
The Occupy Wall Street movement forced the tremendous
growth in U.S. income inequality into the public's consciousness. At
this point the trends are pretty well known. Among earners the U.S. is
now one of the most unequal countries in the world, with its inequality
level rising since the late 1970s and now comparable to that of China .3
Disturbingly, the proportion of national income that goes to employees,
as opposed to capital, is at an all-time low. 4 Finally, and perhaps best
known, is that a disproportionate share of all growth in national income
since the late 1970s has been collected by the top 1% of households. 5
What is probably less well known is that high income inequality
is bad for countries and their citizens. High inequality reduces economic
growth and leads to the concentration of political power in the hands of
a narrow elite. 6 Almost all social problems and public health indicators,
3.

GINI Index, THE WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI/

(last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (providing World Bank inequality data).
4.

Non-Farm Business Sector: Labor Share (PRS85006173), FED. RESERVE BANK OF

ST. Louis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PRS85006173?rid=47&soid=22 (last
visited Jan. 25, 2012).
5. See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A
Historical and InternationalPerspective, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 200 (2006); see also CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME BETWEEN 1979 AND

2007 (Oct. 2011), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/10-25Householdincome.pdf.
6. Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry, Equality and Efficiency, FIN. AND DEV.,
Sept. 2011, at 12, availableat http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2011/09/Berg.htm
(last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
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from homicide to teenage pregnancy, are worse in more unequal
societies. 7 Rising inequality is bad for the social fabric and has been the
trend in the United States for the last three decades.
In U.S. policy discussions, growing inequality is most often
described as the outcome of market forces. Globalization and
technological change in the skills needed in production are the two most
common explanations. 8 In this article we summarize our prior research
showing that the financialization of the U.S. economy had been a major
driver of the rise of income inequality in the U.S. as well as the
destruction of good jobs. One aspect of this process has been the
concentration of economic, political, and market power in a few large
financial institutions, allowing them to absorb an increasing proportion
of the economic value produced in the United States. Another
dimension of this process is that corporations in the non-finance sectors
have increasingly shifted their investment strategies from production
and employment in the real economy to financial speculation and, as
they have done so, reduced employment and increased inequality.
II. DEREGULATION AND FINANCIALIZATION 9

Prior to 1980 the finance sector was regulated to protect both
consumers and the economy more generally from the concentration of
speculative investment and financial power that occurred prior and
contributed to the Great Depression. Most banking activity could not be
carried out across state lines; deposit-taking, insurance, and investment
banking required different firms; and in most states there were usury
rules limiting the interest rates charged on debt. The low-growth, high7.

KATE

PICKETT &

RICHARD

WILKINSON,

THE SPIRIT LEVEL:

WHY

GREATER

EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (Bloomsbury Press 2009).

8. On the theory of skill-biased technological change leading to increased income
inequality and declining labor shares of income, see Daron Acemoglu, Labor and Capital
Augmenting Technical Change, I J. EUR. ECON. Ass'N 1 (2003), and Daron Acemoglu,
Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market, 40 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC

LITERATURE 7 (2002). On the linkage between globalization and U.S. income inequality, see
Arthur S. Alderson & Frangois Nielsen, Globalization and the Great U-Turn: Income
Inequality Trends in 16 OECD Countries, 107 AM. J. Soc. 1244 (2002), and Tali Kristal,
Good Times, Bad Times: Postwar Labor's Share of National Income in Capitalist
Democracies,75 AM. SOC. REV. 729 (2010).
9. An extended version of the analysis in this section can be found in Donald
Tomaskovic-Devey & Ken-Hou Lin, Income Dynamics, Economic Rents, and the
Financializationof the U.S. Economy, 76 AM. SOC. REv. 538 (2011) [hereinafter Income
Dynamics].
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inflation macro-economy of the 1970s led to the mobilization of the
large firm corporate sector to push for economic deregulation, lower
taxes, and a smaller state.' 0 The neoclassical market consensus in the
economics profession reinforced this political agenda with a
disciplinary skepticism of regulation and a preference for market
solutions to policy problems." This emerging neoliberal orientation
rejected state responsibility for managing the economy to promote the
well-being of citizens in favor of fostering a pro-business climate
characterized by limited regulation. David Harvey suggests that one of
the defining actions of neoliberal policy was to protect financial
institutions at all costs. 12
One of the central developments of the 1970s crisis era was
stagflation-the joint occurrence of slow or no economic growth and
high inflation. Slow growth led to fewer outlets for domestic
investment. Inflation undermined the traditional banking practice of
borrowing money from depositors and lending it to borrowers and led to
a sharp drop in bank profitability. The Federal Reserve Bank fought
inflation by rapidly increasing interest rates between 1979 and 1981. '
This tight monetary policy slowed down inflation in the early 1980s and
lured foreign capital to invest in U.S. interest bearing bonds. In 1984, in
order to further encourage the flow of capital into the United States, the
Reagan administration removed the 30% tax on foreign interest income,
intensifying the flow of foreign investment into the United States.14
Inflation, of course, is good for people with debt, but bad for
10. SEYMOUR M. MILLER & DONALD TOMASKOVic-DEVEY, RECAPITALIZING AMERICA:
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CORPORATE DISTORTION OF NATIONAL POLICY (1983); MICHAEL
USEEM, THE INNER CIRCLE: LARGE CORPORATIONS AND THE RISE OF BUSINESS POLITICAL
ACTIVITY IN THE U.S. AND U.K. (1984); MICHAEL USEEM, EXECUTIVE DEFENSE:
SHAREHOLDER POWER AND CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1993);
DAVID VOGEL,
FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF BUSINESS IN AMERICA (1989).

I1. Marion Fourcade-Gourinchas & Sarah L. Babb, The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed:
Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries, 108 AM. J.Soc., 533 (2002); Dustin Avent-Holt,
The Political Dynamics of Market Organization:Cultural Framing,Neoliberalism, and the
Case ofAirline Deregulation,30 Soc. THEORY 283 (2012).
12. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); DAVID HARVEY, THE
ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM (2010).

13.

Krippner, supra note 1; Gerald A. Epstein & Arjun Jayadev,The Rise of Rentier

Incomes in the OECD Countries: Financialization,Central Bank Solidarity and Labor
Solidarity, in FINANCIALIZATION INTHE WORLD ECONOMY, 46 (Gerald A. Epstein ed., 2005).

14.

Greta R. Krippner, The Political Economy of Financial Exuberance, in 30B

MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS: PART A
RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 141(Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch

eds., 2010).
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debt holders. In this way inflation transferred income from banks to
households and firs with fixed interest debt. While tight monetary
policy stabilized the income of the finance sector by taming inflation, it
was deregulation that fundamentally shifted the basic structure of the
economy to favor the financial sector. In 1978 the Supreme Court ruled
that credit card companies could charge the allowable interest rate in the
state in which they were "located."1 5 Most credit card companies
quickly incorporated in South Dakota or Delaware, states without usury
laws. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 198016 removed regulatory caps on interest paid on savings
accounts, allowed credit unions and savings and loans to offer interest
on checking accounts, and preempted many state usury caps on interest
rates charged by depository institutions.17 In 1985, the Federal Reserve
began to allow bank holding companies to own banks in multiple
states.' 8 The 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Act
repealed the final prohibitions on interstate banking. The outcome was a
surge in bank mergers, resulting in a growing concentration of finance
activity in fewer, larger banks. Eventually, the U.S. Congress in the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 repealed parts of the 1933 GlassSteagall Act, making it legal for investment banks, commercial banks,
and insurance companies to become affiliates through a common
holding company.19 This legitimized the already ongoing expansion of
bank holding companies, which operated simultaneously in all financial
markets, created a new consolidated financial services industry in which
household and commercial banking, insurance, and investment services
could all be provided by a single firm, and eventually generated the
systemic (i.e., concentrated densely networked) risk associated with the
financial collapse of the later 2000s. 20
15. Marquette Nat'1 Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299
(1978).
16. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132.
17. An extended version of the analysis in this section can be found in Income
Dynamics, supra note 9.
18. Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159
(1985) (finding state statutes that allowed interstate bank acquisitions by bank holding
companies to be authorized by the Bank Holding Company Act and to not violate the
constitution).
19. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102. 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
20. See Davis, supra note 2; see also Mauro F. Guill6n & Sandra Suar6z, The Global
Crisis of 2007-2009: Markets, Politics,and Organizations, in 30A MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE
ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS: PART A RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY
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Even as the largest financial service firms became cross-sector
bank holding companies, the regulatory system remained fragmented,
mirroring the Glass-Steagall mandated fragmentation of financial
service activity. Fragmented regulation meant that financial services
firms could shop for regulators. Similarly, new legislation in the late
1990s left new financial instruments, such as credit default swaps and
over-the-counter derivatives, largely unregulated. No regulator had an
overview of the whole system, mirroring the increasing within-firm
complexity of financial service firms. 2 1 During the 1980s and 1990s
both the Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission
pulled back from their regulatory role and became cheerleaders for new
financial instruments, allowing new organizational arrangements to
flourish without regulatory oversight.
Figure 1. Growing Financial Assets and Concentration of
Finance, 1966-201 122

STotal Institutions (left axis)
Total Assets

(right axs,

in trillion).
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1980

1990

2000

2010

Year

OF ORGANIZATIONS 257 (Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010).

21. See Guill6n & Suar6z, supra note 21; see also Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein,
The Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, in 30A MARKCETS ON TRIAL: THE
ECONOMIle SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS: PART A, RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY

OF ORGANIZATION 29 (Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 20 10); Jacob S. Hacker &
Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the
Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States, 38 POL. & Soc'Y 152 (2010)
(referring

to this

absence

of adaptive

regulation

in

the

face

of new

finance

sector

organizational forms and products as "regulatory drift").
22. Historical
Statistics
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.asp.

on

Banking

(HSOB),

FDIC,
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Figure 1 shows the increasing concentration of the banking
industry. As the size of assets (in real dollars) controlled by the banking
sector increased between 1966 and 2011, the total number of banking
institutions experienced a sharp decline since the late 1980s. Figure 2
presents the proportion of banking assets owned by the top three bank
holding companies since the 1930s. It shows that the top three banks in
the U.S. now own over 35% of the assets in the banking sector, while
more than half of the banking assets are controlled by merely ten firms.
Figure 2. The Concentration of Assets in the Banking Industry,

1935-201223
Top 3 Bank Holding Companies
- - Top 10 Bank Holdrng Companies

... . ...

I

1940

. .. ..

III

1960

1980

2000

Year

Banks, now allowed to both merge and operate across state
lines, controlled the rapidly growing financial assets in the economy. At
the same time, the rise of institutional investors, both private (e.g.,
pension funds) and public (e.g., countries running budget surpluses such
as Japan in the 1980s, China more recently) provided a steady source of
investment capital to feed continued U.S. financialization. 24 By 2008
the U.S. accounted for 43% of all capital imports in the world.25
23. Historical
Statistics
on
Banking
(HSOB),
FDIC,
http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/download large_1ist-outside.asp (providing HSOB data since
1992; data prior to 1992 was requested via The Freedom of Information Act).
24.
25.

OZGOR ORHANGAZI, FINANCIALIZATION AND THE US ECONOMY (2008).
Guill6n and Suar&, supra note 21.
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Meanwhile, the sector invented new financial instruments, such as
mutual funds, hedge funds, credit default swaps and bundles securities,
to absorb the increased investment flow associated with the rise in
institutional investors and diversion of household savings from
traditional savings accounts into financial markets. 26
III. INCOME REDISTRIBUTION INTO THE FINANCE SECTOR

Figure 3 illustrates the result of the institutional shifts that
facilitated finance sector concentration and regulatory drift relative to
the emerging price setting power of the sector. The figure charts the
increasing concentration of US income inn the financial sector. From
the end of World War II until the early 1980s the FIRE sector 27 realized
between ten and fifteen percent of the profits in the U.S. economy. After
1980 the share of profits in this sector soared, with the lion share going
to banks and bank holding companies. Although the concentration of
profits in the finance sector crashed with the world economy in 2008, it
has since rebounded. In 2011, the most recent date for which we have
numbers, almost a third of the profits generated by the private sector
were controlled by financial firms.

26. See Davis, supra note 2; see also Fligstein & Goldstein, supra note 24.
27. FIRE refers to Finance, Insurance and Real Estate industries. Across the period, the
real estate component is fairly stable; the growth in the series is being driven by increased
profits in security and investments, insurance, and especially, banking. See further
discussion in Income Dynamics, supra note 9.

176

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 18

Figure 3. FIRE Sector Profits/All Profits in the U.S. Economy,
1948-20 1128
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Across the same period the earnings of employees in the
financial sector, especially employees in investment banking and hedge
funds, surged (see Figure 4). From 1945 to about 1980, employees of
investment banks earned on average about twice that of others in the
economy. By the time of the 2008 financial collapse, earnings had risen
to four times the national average. They collapsed somewhat after the
crash, but have since rebounded. Of course, this describes the average
across the whole industry. In 2007 workers employed in this industry
earned $6,891 per week nationally but much more-$16,918 per
week-if employed in Manhattan. In stark contrast, in 2007 the average
American earned only $884 a week. Between 2006 and 2007, just prior
to the collapse of the financial system, wages in securities and
commodities firms grew a remarkable 16.4% nationwide and 21.5%
in Manhattan. 29 Employees on Wall Street, including CEOs and
investment managers in commercial and investment banks, bank
holding companies, and hedge funds made up an increasing share of the
very highest earners in the economy. 30 Overall, finance's share of
28.

National Income and Product Accounts, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON.

http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index-nipa.cfm. CCA stands form Capital
Consumption Allowance, which is an accounting estimate on the amount of capital
consumed in the production process, which should not be taxed as profits.
29. Andrew Sum et al., The Great Divergence: Real-Wage Growth of All Workers
ANALYSIS,

Versus Finance Workers, 51 CHALLENGE 57 (2008).

30.

Stephen N. Kaplan & Joshua Rauh, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes
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national income rose 18% (absolutely, not relatively) in the U.S. after
1980, more than in any of the other OECD countries.3 1
Figure 4. Average Compensation Changes in the FIRE Sector,
1948-20 1132
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Taking pre-1980 level profits and compensation as a reference,
we estimate that between 1980 and 2008 the profit and earnings income
transferred

into

the

finance

sector

as

a

result

of

the

financialization

of

the U.S. economy was $6.5 trillion dollars. This is about six times the
cost of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars put together and about half of the
total U.S. cumulative federal deficit. The financialization of the U.S.
economy has produced a tremendous transfer of income and wealth
from both households and the real economy into financial sector firms,
their owners, and, to some extent, their employees. 33
The important insight is that this transfer of income was not
simply the result of market forces. Changes in the institutional and
regulatory structure of the market were central to producing this
movement of income into the finance sector.

to the Rise in the Highest Incomes? (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
I3270,02007).

31. Epstein &Jayadev, supra note 14.
32. National Income and Product Accounts, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSls, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/indexnipa.cf . The Ratio is calculated as (FIRE
Total Compensation/Private Economy Total Compensation)/(FIRE Total Full-Time
Equivalent Employment/Private Economy Total Full-Time Equivalent Employment).
33. Tomaskovic-Devey &Lin, supra note 9.
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IV. THE FINANCIALIZATION OF THE REST OF THE ECONOMY
The deregulation of financial activity, especially ending
organizational limitations on financial activities, allowed non-financial
firms to expand their financial investment strategies as well.
Manufacturing and retail firms have long been allowed to offer
consumer debt in order to increase sales of their main products. General
Motors Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC") was founded in 1919. GE
Capital was created in 1943. Ford established its financial service
provider Ford Motor Credit in 1959. During the 1980s these firms and
many others changed their behaviors. In the 1980s both GM and Ford
entered mortgage markets, and in the 1990s expanded their activities to
include insurance, banking, and commercial finance. In the 1980s GE
Capital expanded to small business loans, real estate, mortgage lending,
credit cards, and insurance. After running a close second for decades, it
topped GMAC as the largest nonbank lender in 1992.34 In recent years,
GE's financial unit consistently brought in more than half of GE's
profits. 35 In 2004, GM reported that 66% of its $1.3 billion quarterly
profits came from GMAC; the same year Ford reported a loss in its
automotive operation, but $1.17 billion in net income, primarily from its
financial operation.36
These are not isolated examples. Figure 5 presents the ratio of
financial income (interests, dividends, and capital gains.) to realized
profits3 7 for all non-finance firms and for manufacturing firms from
1970 to 2007. Financial income here consists of interest, dividends, and
capital gains, and excludes income from the sale of goods and services.
Since the late 1970s, financial income has become a significant stream
of revenue for U.S. corporations. Among non-finance firms the ratio
was relatively stable and hovered around 0.20 through the late 1970s.

34. These and other examples come from Ken-Hou Lin & Donald Tomaskovic-Devey,
Financializationand U.S. Income Inequality. 1970-2008,118 AM. J. OF Soc. 1284 (2013)
[hereinafter Financialization].
35. David Kocieniewski, G.E. 's Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar.
24,
2011,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
36. Danny Hakim, Detroit Profits Most from Loans, Not Cars, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/22/business/detroit-profits-most-fromloans-not-cars.html.
37. We calculate realized profits as the sum of accounting profits before tax and the
capital consumption allowance.
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The ratio of financial revenue to profits grew to more than 0.35 by
1990, surging again to 0.40 around the turn of the century. The pattern
is more extreme among manufacturing firms: dependence on financial
income increased by a factor of three over the past thirty years. In this
century earnings generated through financial channels is larger than half
of the total profits earned by manufacturing firms.
The change in firm investment behavior was not only about
changes in regulation. During the 1980s the finance conception of the
firm replaced managerial commitments to investment and innovation in
production. 38 Managerial goals of increasing stock prices in the short
term displaced increased market share. 39 The focus on stock prices was
reinforced by the linking of top management pay to stock options rather
than long term market share, sales, or production based profit. The
increased financial engagement of non-financial business, the rise of
shareholder activism and the development of a market for corporate
control shifted managerial orientations from long-term goals of
corporate growth to short-term goals of profitability. 40

38.

See Davis, supra note 2; see also NEIL FLIGSTEIN,

THE ARCHITECTURE OF

MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES

(Princeton University Press 2001).
39. Frank Dobbin & Dirk Zorn, CorporateMalfeasance and the Myth of Shareholder
Value,

17 POLITICAL

POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY,

179-198

(2005);

DAN

KRIER,

SPECULATIVE MANAGEMENT: STOCK MARKET POWER AND CORPORATE CHANGE (2005).

40. See Davis, supra note 2; see also Engelbert Stockhammer, Financialisationand the
slowdown of accumulation, 28 CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 719-741; USEEM, supra
note 10; MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: HOW MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING
THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA (BasicBooks 1996).
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Figure 5. Financial Revenue over Realized Profits, NonFinancial Firms, 1970-200741
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54%

became
between

as

high

1980 and

as

78%

afterward,

with

a

long

term

average

of

2000.42

V. FINANCIALIZATION

AND NON-FINANCE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT

If financialization represents a reduced commitment to
employment and production in favor of financial investments, it would
not be surprising to find that financial strategies pursued by U.S.
corporations led to reduced employment. This could happen for a

number of reasons. The most obvious is that financial assets may
displace investment in production.43 Another aspect of financialization
41. SOI Tax Stats - Corporation Complete Report, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOlTax-Stats-Corporation-Complete-Report. Data prior to 1994 exist only in hard copies and

were converted to machine readable format by the authors. Financial income includes
interests, dividends, and capital gains.
42. Davis, supra note 2.

43. Evidence of investment displacement can be found in cozgir Orhangazi,
Financialisation and Capital Accumulation in the Non-Financial Corporate Sector: A
Theoreticaland Empirical Investigation on the US. Economy, 32 CAMBRIDGE J.EcoN. 863
(2008).
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has been the increased reliance on debt as a source of capital. Many
companies, such as Pepsi, McDonald and Philip Morris, are substituting
debt for stock offerings. 44 Through the power of leverage, this practice
increases the reported return on investment, even when absolute profits
dip, and this inflates stock prices.4 5 Debt holders, unlike stock holders,
must be paid. This shift prioritized debt payments relative to
employment costs. Finally, the shareholder value movement rewards
executives who abandon efforts to increase production and market share
and embrace strategies of downsizing and profit distribution. 46

Evidence for this trend can be found in Ken-Hou Lin, Financialization and Firm
Employment Dynamics, 1982-2005 (2013), (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2284507. Specific evidence
for the firms mentioned here can be found in Casey Hoerth, These Companies Are
Minting Debt to Buy Back Stock, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 8, 2013),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/ 1326111-these-companies-are-minting-debt-tobuy-back-stock.
45. Evidence for this trend can be found in Jon Faust, Will Higher Corporate Debt
Worsen Future Recessions?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV., Mar. 1990,
at 19; and Thomas I. Palley, Financialization:What It is and Why It Matters, in FINANCE-

44.

LED CAPITALISM: MACROECONOMIC

EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 29

(Eckhard Hein et al. eds., 2008).
46. That the shareholder value movement created such pressures is well documented.
See, e.g., Jennifer E. Bethel & Julia Liebeskind, The Effects of Ownership Structure on
Corporate Restructuring, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 15 (1993); Art Budros, The New
Capitalism and OrganizationalRationality: The Adoption of Downsizing Programs, 19791994, 76 Soc. FORCES 229 (1997); Art Budros, OrganizationalTypes and Organizational
Innovation: Downsizing Among Industrial, Financial,and Utility Firms, 15 Soc. F. 273
(2000); Art Budros, The Mean and Lean Firm and Downsizing: Causes of Involuntary and
Voluntary Downsizing Strategies, 17 Soc. F. 307 (2002); Art Budros, Causes of Early and
Later OrganizationalAdoption: The Case of Corporate Downsizing, 74 SoC. INQUIRY, 355
Taekjin Shin, The Shareholder Value Principle: The Governance
(2004);
and Control of Corporationsin the United States, 7 Soc. Compass 829 (2013).
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Figure 6. Revenue and Employment Share of Fortune 500 firms,

1982-200547
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The largest U.S. firms have grown in economic importance even
as they have generated fewer jobs. This disjuncture is in line with most
narratives which identify these firms as most likely to pursue
financialization strategies and respond to the short term expectations of
the stock market and the shareholder value movement's preference for
high returns on investment and reduction in employment.
Figure 6 summarizes the key trends for the largest U.S. firms.
From 1982 to the late 1980s, these large firms' share of employment
and revenue basically moved together. Starting in the late 1980s they
began to diverge. The national share of economic activity as revenue
grew strongly among the largest firms, while employment dropped.

47. S&P Compustat/EEO-1 Reports proprietary data file compiled by authors. Panel B
standardizes both trends using their initial values.
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Figure 7. Increasing Finance Orientation, Non-finance Fortune
500 Firms, 1982-200548
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These firms changed their investment strategies as documented
in Figure 7. The ratio of financial assets (includes items such as
certificates of deposit, commercial paper, government and other
marketable securities, and cash) over all investment soared after 1990,
suggesting that the financialization strategy displaced investment in
production of goods and services. Between the early 1980s and the mid1990s, the ratio of debt to equity financing grew by 20%. Stock
repurchasing followed the business cycle but displays a clear upward
trend. Institutional investors became the dominant stockholders, even as
equity declined as a source of investment capital.
We investigated the linkage between these four indicators of
financialization and employment among the largest U.S. firms. Our
48. S&P Compustat/EEO-1 Reports proprietary data file compiled by authors. Financial
investment includes items such as certificates of deposit, commercial paper, government and
other marketable securities, and cash
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statistical models predict shifts in total domestic employment as well as
high (managers and professionals), medium (technicians, sales, crafts,
and operatives) and low (laborers, clerical, and service) skilled jobs
within each firm, as a function of the four financialization indicators.
Our estimates are net figures of two measures of globalization
(employment and revenue), a series of other firm characteristics, and
industry specific employment trends.49
The key findings are that financial investment, debt financing,
and stock repurchases are all associated with decreased employment at
all levels of job skill. Surprisingly, the growing role of institutional
investors is associated with growing employment in high and mid-level
jobs, not the declining employment predicted by accounts of the
shareholder value movement. Rather, it is the more direct efforts of
managers to increase stock price and move investments out of
production and into financial instruments that reduces employment in
these large publicly traded firms.
Figure 8 displays the pattern of effects of the financialization
and globalization indicators on the employment size of the largest firms
in the United States. We ask what if financialization had not happened?
What if firms had not invested globally? Evidence shows that the
substitution of debt for equity financing had very large negative effects
on employment at all skill levels, and the effect is observable as early as
the mid-1980s. The aggregate employment size of these firms would
have increased about 6% if they had not replaced stock owners and
equity with banks and other debt holders. Since debt holders must be
paid, their claims on the value added by the firm take priority over
equity owners and are in direct competition with employment. The
effects of equity buybacks and that of institutional ownership are not as
large but also begin in the mid-1980s to erode employment. Our
estimates suggest that the shift in investment from production to
financial assets does not undermine employment until the 2000s. Taken
together, these changes reduced aggregate employment by about 12%
by 2008. The two globalization indicators are also associated with
49. The technical paper which contains the details of this analysis is Ken-Hou Lin,
Financialization and Firm Employment Dynamics, 1982-2005 (2013), (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the University of Massachusetts, Amherst) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2284507. The sample is drawn from all
publicly traded non-finance firms that were ever listed in the Fortune 500 between 1982 and
2005 and includes 834 firms and 14,377 firm-year observations.
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reduced employment at all skill levels. Added together globalization of
investment and employment reduces large firm employment by about
the same magnitude as financialization strategies did. Together
globalization and financialization could plausibly account for almost all
of the relative decline in employment among Fortune 500 firms.
One might argue that globalization is a market phenomenon that
large firms must adapt to in order to survive. There is no such defense
of financialization. Financialization is the result of a set of institutional
shifts, especially the deregulation of financial activity, which
encouraged investment in financial instruments and an orientation
toward the capital markets rather than toward production. In the last
section we saw that these institutional shifts led to large income shifts
into the financial sector. In this section we witness how these same
institutional shifts in market rules and incentives undermined
employment in large firms.
Figure 8. Counterfactual Shifts in Employment Size for an
Average Firm50
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VI. FINANCIALIZATION AND NON-FINANCE SECTOR INCOME INEQUALITY
We have also developed models to gauge the consequences of
the rise of financial investment strategies for income distributions. The

50. See Ken-Hou Lin, The Rise of Finance and Firm Employment Dynamics, 19822005
(June
24,
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2284507.
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three big trends we have looked at are (1) the declining share of income
that goes to employees as earnings rather than to owners as profits, (2)
the rise in executive compensation relative to that of other workers, and
(3) the increased inequality in earnings among employees. Figure 9
displays these trends for the non-financial economy.
Figure 9 Income Dynamics, Non-Finance, Non-Agricultural
Economy, 1970-200851
A. Labor's Share of Income
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Complete Report, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-CompleteReport; Current Population Survey, US CENSUS, http://www.census.gov/cps/.
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Our empirical strategy was to observe the investment and
inequality behavior of industries over time. Firm level data, similar to
that used for the employment study, is not available, so we performed
these estimates with data at the industry level. To create such estimates
we needed to create a plausible model that took into account other
changes in the environment of corporations that might have also led to
increases in inequality. We report our estimates of the long term effects
of financialization on the three inequality trends in Figure 10,
controlling for changes in workforce unionization, education and
demographic composition, capital investment both general and in
computers, and global market competition. The logic of our analyses is
to examine within-industry change in financialization and income
distributions controlling statistically for the main alternative
*
increased. 52
explanations as to why inequality
We found that the financialization strategies in the productive
economy are substantively important drivers of all three inequality
trends. These results hold despite strong statistical controls for other
changes in the economic environment. One of the most impressive
aspects of these results is that the connection between financialization
and increased inequality, executive earnings surges, and declining
income shares for employees is uniformly robust across time and
sample. This is not true for the conventional explanations. Computer
investment, for example, is significantly associated with declining labor
share of income and increased earnings inequality, but only before
1997.
We used the estimates from our technical paper to ask what the
inequality trends might have looked like if firms had not pursued
financialization strategies. Figure 10 displays the trends for labor's
share of national income. The black line represents what actually
happened. Labor's share of income dropped absolutely 5%. The other
lines each represent other major shifts in the economy, including
financialization, declining unionization, investment in computers, and
an increasingly educated labor force. Declining unionization and
increased education were the two largest drivers of changes in labor
share of income. The increase in college education in the labor force is
associated with more than a 4% increase in labor's share of national
52. The formal development and presentation of these models can be found in
Financialization,supra note 35.
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income. This positive shift was more than offset by the decline in
unionization, which is associated by the year 2000 with a 6% decline in
labor's share of income. Based on our models, financialization and
computer investment both produced between two and three percent
declines in the share of national income going to workers. 53
Figure 10. Counterfactual Estimates of Changes in Labor
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A similar exercise for executive pay is displayed in Figure 11.
Officers'

compensation

rose from about 6%

of

the total wage bill in

1970 to 9% in 1990, falling back to 7.5% in 2009. Financialization is
associated with about 2%, about one-third, of the rise in executive

53. These do not sum to the total because there are other variables in the model not
reported here.
54. See Financialization,supra note 35.
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compensation, about the same impact as declining unionization.
Surprisingly, computer investment has the strongest effect. Why
computer investment should lead to an increase in officer's
compensation is not at all apparent. The conventional explanation
around skill-biased technological change predicts increased returns to
capital and increased inequality between low and high skill workers, but
makes no prediction as to why top managers would reap such large
rewards. We suspect, similar to other inequality trends, that CEOs and
top executives have been particularly adept at absorbing all new
surpluses in their firms. Money that otherwise might have gone to
increased investment in production, employee compensation, taxes, or
stockholders have increasingly been captured by those who control the
largest corporations.
Figure 11. Counterfactual Estimates of Changes in Officers
Compensation5 5

Trends
- -

Obsverved Trend
Financializaton

%Union
-- Computer Inyv.
-% College

0
e

-

/0

0

I

I

I

I

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Differences

11
1990
C-

'/

1970

-'-

...

.......

II

1080

2000..

.

. . ..

.

20
*

I.

1990

2000

2010

190

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 18

Earnings inequalities among employees are the most thoroughly
explored trend in the social science literature on inequalities. In our
sample of non-financial industries, the variance in log income is our
measure of inequality, and it rose absolutely 10% between the late
1970s and the turn of the century. None of the main explanations
accounts for large parts of these trends. Financialization and computer
investment each contribute about 1%, while declining unionization and
increased college education contributed about half as much.
Overall, financialization is a robust contributor to all three
inequality trends, but its influence seems to be strongest on the general
decline in the bargaining power of labor and the increased income of
executives. Financialization as a strategy has reduced the income of
employees while increasing the share of income going to both owners
and CEOs.
Figure 12. Counterfactual Estimates of Changes in Earnings
Inequality 56
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VII. POLICY CONCLUSIONS

We have long known that the fundamental risk of capitalism is
that it is driven by the interests and influence of capital and so runs the
risk of immiserating citizens. This risk has been seen as tolerable when
capitalism delivers growing standards of living to counterbalance
inequalities of reward. The collapse of the financial system has drawn
our attention to a second type of fundamental risk, this one systemic in
nature, embedded in the high-risk behavior of a concentrated,
interconnected banking system. Here the risk is of collapse, which
threatens everyone, owners of capital and suppliers of labor alike.
Financialization presents a systemic risk to the entire economy. We
argue that financialization has also, in a less dramatic but no less
consequential sense, produced the first more classic form of risk-the
immiseration of the population.
Financialization is at its root a system of income redistribution
which favors the finance sector over the non-finance sector, financial
investments over investments in production, and shareholders and top
executives over workers and middle-class citizens. In addition,
financialization is a product of regulatory decisions, both decisions to
deregulate and encourage the concentration of financial power in a few
large institutions and the failure to regulate new financial instruments or
strategies. As a result income increasingly is diverted from investment,
employment, and production into financial instruments, and the
economic surplus of the society pools in the accounts of the owners of
financial instruments and financial service firms.
Our studies have several policy implications. First, it is a
consensus across the political spectrum that the hyper-concentration in
the finance sector increases the vulnerability of the U.S. economy. The
consensual solution to reduce the systemic risk posed by concentrated
finance is either deleveraging the colossal banks57 or better yet breaking
these banks up altogether. The results of our analysis recommend the
latter. The concentrated market power possessed by these large banks
not only creates systemic risk but also generates economic rent-the
constant transfer of income from the productive sector to the finance
sector. By breaking up the large financial institutions, we reduce the
57. See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES: WHAT'S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013).
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likelihoods of future financial catastrophes as well as fraud,5 8 anti-trust
violations, 59 and conflicts of interests, 60 all of which are all too common
practices in the contemporary finance sector. Furthermore, if markets
are occupied by more sizable, but not gigantic, firms, the incentive to
preserve reputation may become greater than the incentive to create
short-term profits. Another approach is to create one or more
government-owned corporations to directly provide affordable credit to
small businesses and households. A public option would force the
financial sector as a whole to become competitive and more efficient,
provide prudent loans, and protect households and small business from
predatory lending and fee-based financial services. The 2010 federal
absorption of the student loan program is an example in progress.
Regulatory capture is always a risk, perhaps nowhere more than
in the increasingly large and complex organization of bank holding
companies. Regulators should avoid dependence on the information and
the knowledge from the providers of the services and make regulatory
decisions based on independent studies that emphasize the needs of the
customers of financial service firms, not the preferences and needs of
those firms. 6 1 This will require substantially more research capacity
than currently exists in the regulatory agencies. Moreover, the Wall
Street-Washington revolving door needs to be sealed tightly. The post
government employment restrictions of the SEC should be strengthened
and extended to other regulatory agencies.
The Federal Reserve is a large part of the problem, defining its
role in terms of the interests of the few large bank holding companies,
rather than the society in general. The regulators' embrace of the
58. See Peter Lattman, A Guilty Plea over Mortgage Bond Fraud,DEALBOOK (Apr. 13,
2013),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9CO7E4DB 1F3FF930A25757COA9659D8
B63.
59. See Jesse Eisinger, Swap Market, Like Libor, Is Vulnerable to Manipulation,
DEALBOOK (July 18, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/behindcredit-default-swaps-market-a-cartel-left-open-to-collusion/.
See also Jessica SilverGreenberg, MasterCardand Visa Settle Claims of Antitrust, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2012, at
B1; see also Matt Taibbi, The Scam Wall Street Learnedfrom the Mafia, ROLLING STONE,
June 21, 2012, availableat http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-scam-wall-streetlearned-from-the-mafia-20120620.
60. Graham Bowley, With Settlement, Blankfein Keeps His Grip, DEALBOOK (July 16,
2010, 4:27 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/with-settlement-blankfein-keepshis-grip/; Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Rigging the IP.O. Game, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2013, at SRI.
61.

See JOHN KAY, DEP'T FOR Bus., INNOVATION & SKILLS, THE KAY REVIEW OF U.K.

EQuITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION MAKING: FINAL REPORT (2012).
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efficient market hypothesis and the political strength of Wall Street in
the executive and legislative branches of U.S. government are strong
barriers to effective regulation. As money continues to be channeled
from New York City to Washington, D.C., in order to influence the
decisions on the future of the finance sector and the U.S. economy as a
whole, real economic reform needs to begin with a political reform,
with organized countervailing forces that restrain Wall Street and
promote the interests of the citizens.6 2 We believe that the independence
of regulatory agencies should be fostered and regulators should become
proactive in fostering a smaller, less lucrative, and less speculative
financial sector.
There is also a role for other large actors, such as state pension
systems and non-financial firms that have not pursued financialization
strategies, to bring pressure on Washington to increase the
independence of regulators and reduce the power of the largest financial
firms. We also encourage industrial and public sector unions to
recognize financial regulation as directly relevant to the well-being of
their members and take a more active role in the process of financial
reform.
Finally, we consider the unthinkable. The dilemma of the
current recovery is essentially a principal-agent problem. The
government needs banks to provide credit to the productive sector and
recharge the economy, while the post-crash guiding principles of these
banks are profit-maximization strategies coupled with risk avoidance
measures. A consequence of this disjunction is that the government
continues to subsidize the banks through discount window loans and
loan and deposit guarantees, while the banks are not expected to pass
these subsidies to their customers. One estimate is that for the top 10
largest banks these loan subsidies and guaranties are worth $83 billion
dollars a year. 63 If the solvency of the finance sector is to be insured,
some check on their market power should be explored. One solution to
this problem is to restructure the incentives and tie the banking sector's
profitability to economy-wide growth. Surplus profits could be taxed
62. See the discussion of the efficient markets hypothesis and political capture in
James Crotty, StructuralCauses of the GlobalFinancialCrisis:A CriticalAssessment of the
'New FinancialArchitecture,' 33 CAMBRIDGE J. EcoN. 563 (2009).
63. The Editors, Why Should Taxpayers Give Big Banks $83 Billion a Year?,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/why-shouldtaxpayers-give-big-banks-83-billion-a-year-.html.
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and redistributed for long-term investments in infrastructure, human
capital, and research and development.

